address are generally valid ones concerning social psychology and scientific inquiry, but they sometimes serve to suggest that social psychologists &dquo;may still be able to benefit from lessons in the philosophy and history of science&dquo; (Elms, 1975, p. 973) . While social psychologists' lack of familiarity with philosophical treatments of theory construction, hypothesis derivation, and confirmation is usually only suggested by instances of misused terminology, omitted discussion of major concepts and distinctions, and the presentation of philosophically naive and inaccurate conclusions, the problem becomes particularly obvious in discussions of the value and possibility of performing &dquo;crucial&dquo; experimental tests of social psychological theories.
Many of the experiments within social psychology are designed to examine the empirical adequacy of current theoretical frameworks, and several attempts have been made to provide crucial experimental tests of these theories (c.f., Bem & McConnell, 1970; Greenwald, 1975) . As the term is usually used, a crucial experiment is one that will either confirm a given theory or, when two conflicting theories are involved, confirm one while disconfirming the alternative. For example, in the area of attitude change research, numerous attempts have been made to design and conduct experiments which critically examine dissonance and self-perception theory predictions.
In his review of these experiments, Greenwald (1975, p. (Hempel, 1966 (cf. Hempel, 1965; Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1959) . This selection among possible theories is possible since theories are not evaluated solely in terms of their empirical precision and adequacy. As Hempel (1966, p. (Bem & McConnell, 1970, p. 
